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Collective Redress in EU Competition Law:
An Open Question with Many Possible
Solutions
Arianna ANDREANGELI *
This paper analyses the current trends of the debate in the area of collective redress of injuries
caused by the consequences of anti-competitive behaviour in the EU in light of the more recent
case law governing class certification of antitrust collective complaints in the US federal courts
and of the legislative developments occurring in several European jurisdictions. Whilst not
advocating the total ‘transplantation’ of opt-out class actions in EU competition law, it will
illustrate that the Commission’s concerns as to the viability of these collective lawsuits have
become less pressing and consequently, will argue for a more open-minded discussion of how to
create effective and fair mechanisms for the collective redress of individual rights.
It will first provide a brief examination of the current approach adopted by the
Commission to collective redress in the area of competition law and, more specifically, in respect
to ‘diffuse torts’. Thereafter, the paper will analyse the case law of the US Superior Federal
Courts concerning the class certification of collective antitrust complaints and illustrate that the
Commission’s scepticism as to the viability of these actions may no longer be justified. It will be
shown that the scrupulous scrutiny of the proposed class filings, conducted by the American courts
can contribute effectively to ‘identifying’ prima facie unmeritorious claims and thereby allowing
only truly ‘suitable’ complaints to proceed as class actions.
In light of the forgoing, it will be concluded that the Commission’s position on these issues
seems difficult to sustain and could even become an obstacle to discussing how to respond to the
demands of ensuring effective redress to the victims of torts having a widespread impact on society
and the economy, for which individual dispute settlement may be inefficient.
1 INTRODUCTION
In February 2011 the European Commission launched a consultation exploring
possible avenues toward a ‘coherent European approach to collective redress’ of
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individual rights. This is however not a new concern. From the 1993 Notice on
Cooperation with National Courts via the 2004 Green Paper to eventually the
2008 White Paper on antitrust damages the Commission has attempted to address
the problem of the continuing (albeit with limited exceptions1) poor take up of
civil action designed to recover damages arising from practices infringing Articles
101 and 102 TFEU and in that context discussed the ability of group litigation to
deal with this problem.2 Consequently, the 2011 Consultation on collective redress
represents a welcome restatement of the Commission’s concern for strengthening
these tools of ‘group justice’. Importantly, the 2011 Document takes this discussion
beyond the confines of competition law and into the broader context of tort law,
focusing on how to provide redress to individuals affected by ‘diffuse’ harmful
behaviour.3 Slightly less reassuring, however, are many of the premises on which
the Commission has placed the debate. Although the Consultation Paper adopts a
broad reading of the concept of collective redress, which is defined as ‘any
mechanism that may accomplish the cessation or prevention of unlawful business
practices which affect a multitude of claimants or the compensation for the harm
caused by such practices’, it reiterates its long-held distrust for ‘US style’ opt-out
class litigation. 4
As is well known, Rule 23 of the US Rules of Civil Procedure allow ‘one or
more members of a class to sue (…) as representative parties on behalf of all
members’ if the class is so wide as to make joinder ‘impracticable’, if the action
stems from common questions of law or of fact and the claims asserted by the
named claimant are ‘typical’ to the whole class. In addition, the plaintiff must satisfy
the court of his or her ability to ‘fairly and adequately’ represent the class. Having
regard specifically to damages’ actions, certification for new lawsuits is usually
sought under subsection (b)(3) according to which ‘the court [must find] that the
questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any
1 See e.g. A. Komninos, New prospects for private enforcement of EC competition law: Courage v Crehan
and the Community right to damages, 39 Com. Mkt. L.Rev.447, 450–451 and 467–469 (2002);
more recently, Peyer, Myths and untold stories—private antitrust enforcement in Germany, UEA—
Centre for Competition Policy Working Paper No 10-12, available at: http://papers.
ssrn. com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1672695.
2 See e.g. Commission White Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules,
COM(2008) 165 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the 2008White Paper’), para. 1.1-1.2.
3 European Commission, Joint Information Note: “A coherent approach to European collective
redress”, Feb. 4, 2011, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/2/2010/EN/
2-2010-1192-EN-1-0.Pdf, hereinafter referred to as “2011 Consultation document”.
4 Id., see especially secs. 17–18.
WORLD COMPETITION530
questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to
other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.’ Rule
23 also obliges the named plaintiff, if certification is granted, to serve the ‘best
practicable notice’ to all class members; once that requirement is fulfilled, the final
judgment will be binding on all class members that have ‘not requested exclusion’
by exercising their right to ‘opt out’ of the action within the time limit set in the
notice.
The Commission has repeatedly stigmatized these actions, disciplined by Rule
23 of the US Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as FRCP)
as a source of ‘abuse’ and of ‘unmeritorious’ litigation. According to the 2011
Consultation document, the allegedly ‘unlimited’ standing to bring these actions,
along with other ‘incentives to sue’, such as, inter alia, fee-shifting rules have been
regarded in Europe as potentially threatening the integrity of the judicial process.
It could be argued that, in light of a number of ‘mass tort’ lawsuits lodged in the
US especially in the 1980s and 1990s, some of these allegations are not entirely
ill-founded.5 However, it is suggested that the evolution of the standing inquiry
and of the interpretation of some of the class certification standards in the US
courts’ case law may make these allegations more difficult to support.
This paper does not advocate the total ‘transplantation’ of opt-out class actions
in EU competition law. Instead, it will illustrate that many of the Commission’s
concerns have become less pressing and consequently, will argue for a more
open-minded discussion of the options available to create efficient and effective
mechanisms for the collective redress of individual rights, coupled with safeguards
against abuse.6 It will first provide a brief examination of the current approach
adopted by the Commission to collective redress in the area of competition law
and, more specifically, in respect to ‘diffuse torts’.
It will be argued that the Commissions’ views, that are poised clearly against
the introduction of ‘US style’, opt-out class actions risk preventing a
wider-ranging discussion as to what is the most suitable option to ensure effective
access to justice as well as efficient adjudication, especially by preventing repetitive
filings. For this purpose, the paper will analyse the case law of the US Superior
Federal Courts concerning the class certification of collective complaints under
Rule 23(b)(3) of the FRCP. It will be illustrated that the Commission’s scepticism
as to the viability of these actions may no longer be fully justified. In particular, it
will be shown that the scrupulous scrutiny of the proposed class filings, conducted
by the American courts can contribute effectively to ‘identifying’ prima facie
5 2011 Consultation Document, paras 17–18.
6 See id. at para. 17. See inter alia Re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litigation, 552 F3d 305 at 311.
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unmeritorious claims and thereby allowing only truly ‘suitable’ complaints to
proceed as class actions.
Thus, it will be concluded that the Commission’s position on these issues
seems increasingly out of step with the US Courts’ more recent jurisprudence as
well as of the experience of several Member States in this area, and could even
become an obstacle to a broad, principled discussion of the question of how to
respond to the demands of ensuring effective redress to the victims of not only
antitrust infringements but also of other torts having a widespread impact on
society and the economy, for which individual dispute settlement may be
inefficient.
2 THE EMERGENCE OF COLLECTIVE REDRESS AS A ‘LIVE ISSUE’
FOR THE COMMISSION IN COMPETITION ENFORCEMENT
2.1 THE EVOLUTION OF THE EU AGENDA FOR GROUP ACTIONS: A SHORT
SUMMARY
The question of how to boost the currently ‘patchy’ and relatively scarce rate of
private claims based on an infringement of the EU Competition rules has been at
the forefront of the European Commission’s agenda for nearly twenty years and
this paper cannot exhaustively comment on this debate.7 As is well known, the
take up of actions for damages arising from the impact of anti-competitive
behaviour, sanctioned by the Court of Justice of the EU in Crehan8 and
Manfredi,9 has been very limited in the great majority of the Member States,10
with Germany a notable exception to this trend.11
To respond to the concerns associated with a perceived lack of ‘restoration’ of
these losses, the Commission proposed in its 2008 White Paper, among other
measures, the creation of new (or the strengthening of existing) tools for the
collective redress as a means to boosting the access to the courts of those
7 See Commission White Paper on Modernisation of the rules implementing Articles 85 and 86 EC
Treaty [now 101 and 102 TFEU], [1999] OJ C132/1 (hereinafter referred to as 1999 White Paper),
especially paras 6, 8-10; for commentary, see e.g. Wouter Wils, Should private antitrust enforcement be
encouraged in Europe?, 26 World Competition 473 (2003) ; also A. Komninos, Public and private antitrust
enforcement in Europe: complement? Overlap?, 3 Competition L. Rev. 5 (2006).
8 Case C-453/99,Courage v. Crehan [2001] ECR I-6297, paras 19–23; see also para,. 24–27 and 31.
9 Case C-295/04,Manfredi v. Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA [2006] ECR I-6619, paras 60–61; also case
C-101/04,Cipolla v. Fazari [2006] ECR I-11421, paras 46–47; see also paras 62–64.
10 See D Waelbroeck, D Slater and G Even-Shoshan, ‘Study on the conditions of claims for damages in
case of infringement of the EC competition rules’, Aug. 31, 2004, Comparative Report, para 1; also
Rodger,Competition law litigation in the UK, 27 Eur. Competition L. Rev. 235, 241-242 (2006) .
11 Peyer, “Myths and untold stories – private antitrust enforcement in Germany”, UEA – Centre for
Competition Policy Working Paper No 10-12, available at: http://papers.ssrn. com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=1672695, especially pp. 27-28.
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individuals or businesses adversely affected by unlawful practices.12 It was
suggested that ‘bundling together’ a large number of small value claims would
minimize the cots and the difficulties as well as eliminating the risk of repetitive
adjudication associated with bringing these actions individually.13
However, the Commission’s proposals were limited to the introduction of
opt-in actions and of claims brought by representative bodies (such as consumer
associations) on behalf of their members. Despite their successful record in this
area, ‘US style’ opt-out class actions were rejected on the ground that they would
create an unacceptable risk of ‘over-deterrence’ and over-compensation of prima
facie unlawful behaviour and would also endanger the overall fairness of the
adjudicative process, by encouraging ‘groundless’ claims.14 It should be
emphasized that the range of options envisaged by the Commission remains
equally limited today: in its 2011 Consultation document the Commission
rejected opt-out class actions as ‘inappropriate’ and as potentially capable of
transforming the ‘compensatory’ nature of the damages’ remedy, not just in
competition law but in the general context of EU law, into a punitive tool.15 It
also confirmed its concerns for the risk of ‘abuse’ of the judicial process that it had
repeatedly associated with these actions.16
It is acknowledged that much of the Commission’s scepticism as regards the
viability and the overall fairness of Rule 23(b)(3) FRCP actions is not totally
unfounded but stems from the notorious examples of certification of actions
involving ‘sprawling classes’ (for instance, in the litigation concerning the victims
of asbestos exposure-related illnesses) and often resulting in ‘deep pocket’
12 Commission Green Paper—Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, COM(2005) 0672
Final, SEC (2005) 1732, hereinafter referred to as ‘the 2005 Green Paper’, paras 5-6; see also 2005 Staff
Working Paper accompanying the 2005 Green Paper, paras 188 and 193-194. For commentary, inter
alia, David Rosenberg, The regulatory advantage of class actions, in Regulation through Litigation 272–274
(W. KipViscusi ed.,AEI Brookings Institution Press 2002); also, more generally, Deborah R. Hensler et
al.,Class Actions Dilemmas, 407–410(RAND Institute 2000).
13 See e.g. Benston, A comprehensive analysis of the determinants of private antitrust litigation, with particular
emphasis on class action suit and the rule of joint and several damages, in Private antitrust litigation: new
evidence, new learning, 271 (L.J.White ed.,MIT Press 1988).
14 See e.g. 2008 Impact Assessment Document, para. 119; see also White Paper, Commission Working
Document SEC(2008) 404 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the 2008 Working Document’), para. 58. For
commentary, see e.g.T.L. Russell,Exporting class actions to the European Union, 28 B.U. Intl. L. J. 141, 152
ff.(2010) ; also, more recently see the response of the European Competition Lawyers’ Forum, (ECLF)
to the 2011 Consultation document, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/
2011_collective_redress/eclf_en. pdf, pp. 6–11; see also, inter alia, Denozza and Toffoletti,
“Compensation function and deterrence effects of private actions for damages: the case of antitrust
damages suits”, March 2008, available at: http://papers.ssrn. com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=1116324, pp. 5-7; see also pp. 20-25.
15 2011 Consultation document, , paras 7-9 and 20-22; see also response of the UK Competition Law
Association to the 2011 Consultation document, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/
consultations/2011_collective_redress/uk_cla_en. pdf, section 2.
16 2011 Consultation Document, paras 8-9.
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defendants being able to buy impunity for the harmful consequences of their
conduct.17 However, it is legitimate to ask whether these concerns are tenable
today. It may also be queried whether the judicial practice of granting certification
only on the basis of a ‘broad’ finding of the existence of ‘common questions’ has
been reined in by the US Federal Courts.
2.2 THE US FEDERAL COURTS AND CLASS CERTIFICATION IN ANTITRUST CASES:
SELECTING ‘MERITORIOUS’ GROUP CLAIMS?
Having outlined the Commission’s position as regards the suitable options for
collective redress in the EU, this section will discuss them in light of the more
recent case law of the US Federal Courts concerning class certification of antitrust
group complaints. It was anticipated that much of the criticism levelled against the
use of Rule 23(b)(3) FRCP had originated from an ‘improper’ application of this
provision in cases which, due to the widespread and diverse nature of the proposed
classes, turned out to be unsuitable to class treatment.18 In this specific respect, it is
well known that already in the 1990s the US Supreme Court had denounced
similar cases as examples of an ‘adventuresome use’ of Rule 23(b)(3), which should
therefore be avoided in the future.19
This position should be contrasted with the views expressed in respect to
collective antitrust complaints, which have, instead, been consistently regarded as
suitable to class litigation. In Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co the US Supreme Court held
that granting class certification in these cases could contribute to achieving key
policy goals, by reinforcing ‘the efficacy of private actions by permitting citizens to
combine their limited resources to achieve a more powerful litigation posture’ 20
vis-à-vis economically powerful defendants. As a result of certification large
number of claimants, who would otherwise have little chance of having their day
in court would be able to seek redress for the harmful consequences of pervasive
and often unnoticed injuries.21 It was added that lodging class complaints
17 Amchem Products Inc. v.Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 at 598–599, 625; see also Georgine v.AmChem Products Inc,
157 FRD 246. For commentary, see e.g. Deborah R. Hensler et al., Class action dilemmas, 10–11,
114–116 (RAND Publishing Ltd 2000); see also John Coffee, The corruption of the class action, 80
Cornell L Rev 851, 854–855(1995) .
18 See e.g. Amchem Products Inc. v.Windsor, 521 US 591 at 598–599, 625; see also Georgine v. AmChem
Products Inc, 157 FRD 246.
19 See e.g. Georgine v. AmChem Products Inc (Court of Appeals, 3rd Circuit), 83 F.3d 610 at 623; see also
630–631; see also W. Schwarzer, Settlement of mass tort class actions: order out of chaos, 80 Cornell L Rev
837, 839(1995).
20 Hawaii v. Standard Oil, 405 US 251 at 266.
21 See e.g.Zenith Radio Corp v. Hazeltine Inc, 395 US 100 at 130–131.
WORLD COMPETITION534
complemented the role of public enforcement since it would bring before the
courts alleged infringements that may not otherwise have been detected.22
However, the suitability of class litigation to collective damages claims based
on Section 4 of the Clayton Act does not stem only from policy reasons. It is clear
from the relevant case law that these actions23 tend to conform to the certification
criteria of Rule 23(b)(3) more readily than other ‘mass accident’ claims which, by
the nature of the damage suffered by the claimants, often give rise to a vast array of
questions that are peculiar to individual class members.24 It was explained in, inter
alia,Weeks v. Bareco Oil Co that although class members could be affected by prima
facie anti-competitive behaviour with varying intensity and consequently could
claim different amounts of damages,25 the ‘gist’ of their claim would remain the
same, i.e. ‘the alleged damage [arising] from the alleged wrongful act’ committed
by the same defendant.26 So long as (1) the existence of a conspiracy to constrain
rivalry on the market or of unilateral acts of monopolization, (2) the occurrence of
direct injury to the class members’ property or businesses and (3) the existence of
a nexus of causality between the conduct and the loss suffered are capable of proof
on the basis of ‘generalised evidence (…) on a simultaneous class-wide basis’,27
certification would often be forthcoming.28
The scope and the degree of complexity of the assessment to be conducted
under Rule 23(b)(3), however, can vary according to the nature of the alleged
breach. Thus, in relation to collective claims of price-fixing, it was held that
‘because the gravamen of [the] (…) claim is that the price in a given market is
artificially high’, the certifying judge would generally conclude that all purchasers
of the same product on that market have been affected by the practice in a similar
way and, consequently, their loss could be proven via common evidence.29 The
inquiry can instead become more complex when certification is sought for
complaints alleging ‘less serious’ infringements, such as those occurring in the
context of vertical relationships or arising from allegedly unlawful tying. For
instance, in Ungar the 3rd Circuit of the Court of Appeals held that the need to
prove individual coercion when the plaintiffs could not rely on any contractual
22 See e.g. Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, 457 US 465 at 472; for commentary, inter alia, B. Kaplan,
Continuing the work of the Civil Committee: 1966 amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 81
Harv. L. Rev. 356, 397–398 (1967); also Aareda & Hovenkamp, Principles of US Antitrust Enforcement, 3rd
Ed.,Vol. IIA, pp. 68–70; also Jones, Private enforcement of antitrust law in the EU, US and the UK, 168–169
( OUP 2000).
23 See inter alia Mullarkey v. Holsum Bakery, US DC Ariz, (1988) 120 FRD 118 at 120-121.
24 Advisory Committee’s Notes to proposed rules of Civil Procedure, 39 FRD 69 at 103.
25 Weeks v. Bareco Oil Co, 125 F2d 84 at 91.
26 Id.
27 Re: Foundry Resins Antitrust Litigation, 242 FRD 393 at 409.
28 For commentary, see Newberg, section 18:25.
29 In re: Potash Antitrust Litigation, 159 FRD 682 at 695-696; also in Re: Foundry, supra n. 46, at 410.
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‘tie-in’ clause as part of a uniformly applicable commercial arrangements would be
incompatible with class certification,30 since in that case ‘common evidence’ of an
essential element of the alleged offence was lacking.31
Although the implications arising from the more recent case law concerning
the ‘predominance’ inquiry will be examined in more detail below, it can be
concluded that US opt-out class actions have been successfully deployed to
reconcile the goal of access to justice with the needs of due process and of efficient
adjudication. While the use of these lawsuits in mass injury cases was widely
criticized, it is clear that the same concerns may not be so significant in respect to
allegations of antitrust infringements, especially the most serious ones.
2.3 CAN ‘ANYONE’ REALLY SUE? ADMISSIBILITY AND CLASS CERTIFICATION IN
ANTITRUST CASES:‘ANTITRUST INJURY’, ‘COMMONALITY’ AND ‘PREDOMINANCE’
Having illustrated the principal features of the ‘opt out’ class action model
underpinning Rule 23(b)(3) FRCP, the analysis will now turn to a more detailed
consideration of the US Federal Courts’ approach to certification of class antitrust
lawsuits. As anticipated in section 2.2 the conditions enumerated in Rule 23(b)(3)
respond to the need to achieve goals of efficient and fair adjudication of collective
lawsuits first and foremost by ensuring the ‘cohesiveness’ of the proposed classes,32
as is especially apparent in respect to assessment of the standing condition of
‘antitrust injury’.33
Although the limited scope of this work does not allow an analysis of the
questions associated with locus standi, it is indispensable to recall that this concept
was introduced by the US Congress to limit access to the Courts to claimants
alleging losses arising from prima facie anti-competitive behaviour that the Act
was designed to forestall. 34 The US Supreme Court held in Brunswick that damage
linked to a prima facie antitrust infringement by a nexus of causality would only
be compensable under Section 4 of the Clayton Act if it was among those losses
that the Act was aimed at preventing, i.e. damage arising from the adverse impact
of a reduction of competition on the plaintiff’s business or property.35
30 Ungar et al. v. Dunkin’ Donuts Inc, 531 F2d 1211 at 1224.
31 Id., at 1216. Cf, inter alia,McDonough v.Toys’R’Us, 638 F Supp 2d 461, especially at 481–483.
32 See e.g. In Re: Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litigation, 552 F. 3d 305 at 311. For commentary see
Joshua P. Davis & Eric L. Cramer,Antitrust, class certification and the politics of procedure, 17 Geo. Mason L
Rev 969 (2010).
33 Re:New MotorVehicles Canadian Antitrust Litigation, 522 F3d 6.
34 See e.g. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 US 330 at 337; also Brunswick v. Pueblo-O-Mat, 429 US 477 at
484–485.
35 Brunswick v. Pueblo-O-Mat, 429 US 477 at 488.
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In the McCready decision it was held that in accordance with principles of
causation and remoteness of the injury36 this appraisal should encompass both ‘the
physical and economic nexus between the alleged violation and the harm suffered’
by the claimant and ‘the relationship of the injury alleged with those forms of
injury’ that the Clayton Act had been designed to prevent:37 so long as the plaintiff
could make a showing that the loss he or she had suffered was a ‘clearly
foreseeable’ consequence of the ‘means by which [the respondent] had sought to
achieve its illegal ends’,38 he or she could stand in judgment against the
defendant.39
It is therefore clear that the notion of ‘antitrust injury’ encompasses all forms
of loss that in the intention of Congress are among those that the Clayton Act was
designed to prevent, having regard to the nature of the practice, the extent to
which the injury was a direct or indirect consequence of the alleged infringement
and the degree of ‘speculation’ characterizing the claim.40 It is emphasized that
these considerations are crucial for the certification inquiry, due to the complexity
of the theories often proposed to demonstrate the existence of harm and to any
individual circumstances affecting only certain class members, even though the
‘nucleus of facts’ is common to all.41
Accordingly, the certifying courts have adopted a very careful attitude to the
certification appraisal, even in prima facie relatively ‘straightforward’ cases. In
respect to the ‘commonality’ inquiry, it has often been held that each action, to
merit class treatment, must not only concern facts whose adverse consequences are
broadly common to a potentially wide group of individuals or businesses.42 It is
also indispensable to demonstrate, already at an early stage of the litigation, that all
the elements of a prima facie antitrust infringement, including the alleged injury,
are amenable to proof on a class-wide basis.43
A similar approach has also been adopted for the appraisal of the
‘predominance’ of common over individual issues of law or of fact44 which seeks
36 Blue Shield ofVirginia v.McCready, 457 US 465 at 477.
37 Id., at 478.
38 Id., at 479.
39 Id., at 483–484.
40 Associated General Contractors of California Inc v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 US 519 at
538–539; see also 541-43; also Illinois Brick Co v. Illinois, 431 US 720 at 744–745.
41 See inter alia Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 US 156 at 177–178.
42 Inter alia, see Brown v. Cameron-Brown Co, 92 FRD 32 at 38.
43 Id. See also, inter alia, Times Picayune Publishing v. US, 345 US 594 at 605; Ungar, supra n. 30, at 1218
and 1224; Young v. Jo-Ann Nut House, unrep., available at: 1980 WL 1987, pp. 5-8. See also, mutatis
mutandis, most recently,Wal-Mart Stores Inc v. Dukes et al., judgment of June 20, 2011, not yet reported,
available as 2011WL 2437013, especially at 4–7.
44 See inter alia, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 US 156 at 177–178. For commentary, see B. Kaplan,
Continuing work of the Civil Committee: 1966 amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 81 Harv.
L. Rev. 356, 389–390 (1967); also Newberg, 4th Ed., sect. 4:24, p. 155.
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to avoid ‘mini-trials’ concerning individual class members at the merits’ stage.45 It
was held in Visa Check, a decision concerning the certification of a class complaint
of unlawful tying, that to meet the ‘predominance’ requirement the plaintiffs must
proffer a ‘common theory of injury’ and demonstrate that this injury could be
ascertained through proof common to all members of the class,46 for instance by
relying on evidence of a common contractual obligation imposed on the class as a
whole.47 As to the element of antitrust injury,48 this requirement would be
fulfilled if the existence of loss could be proven via a common method, regardless
of whether the size of individual claims required individualized calculation. 49
A similar approach was adopted by the District Court for Missouri in the Re:
Catfish Antitrust Litigation decision, concerning allegations of unlawful retail price
maintenance arrangements agreed by catfish producers and processors, which at
the time were treated as a ‘per se’ offence.50 The Court took the view that as a
result of these practices, all purchasers of these products had been hit by artificially
high prices and were therefore likely to have suffered ‘the same type of injury by
paying more (…) than would have happened in a truly competitive
environment’.51 On that basis, the Court granted certification, holding that due to
the nature of the allegations and of the evidence offered, especially in respect to
the allegation of ‘antitrust injury’, the named plaintiff had made a sufficiently
convincing ‘threshold showing’ of the ‘common’ impact of the alleged
infringement.52
In light of the above analysis, it may be argued that common issues arising
from allegations of antitrust infringements are likely to ‘predominate’ over
individual ones if the plaintiffs can offer prima facie common proof of all the
elements of the alleged infringement and especially of its impact on all members
of the class. However, it is equally apparent that the certifying courts in the cases
discussed above reached their decision on the basis of a ‘meticulous’ review of the
evidence offered by both parties, including that of an expert nature, as well as of
their arguments.53 Some authors questioned the breadth of this inquiry and
argued that it may result in placing an undue burden on the named plaintiff, who
45 See, inter alia, Collective Buyers League v. F & F Investments, 48 FRD 7 at 1112; also, mutatis mutandis,
Sommers v.Abraham Lincoln Federal Savings and Loans Association, 66 FRD 581 at 590–591.
46 192 FRD 68 at 84–85 and 87–88; see also in Re:Visa Check Master Money Antitrust Litigation, 280
F3d 124 at 130.
47 Id., at 136.
48 Id., at 137.
49 Id., at 139-140; see also, inter alia, Re: Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, 82 FRD 143 at 154.
50 Re: Catfish Antitrust Litigation, 826 F Supp 1019.
51 Id., at 1040.
52 Id., at 1041–1042. See also, e.g., In Re:Master Key antitrust litigation, 528 F2d 5 at 12;Graphic Products
Distributors v. Ilek Corp., 717 f2d 1569 at 1578–1579; J Truett Payne Co Inc v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451
US 577 at 565–566.
53 See e.g. id., at 1030 ff.; also Catfish, supra n. 50, at 137 ff.
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would have to ‘frontload’ the evidence in support of his or her case, as well as
hampering the due process rights of defendants, who would not enjoy all the
benefits of a full trial.54
For a time at least, the US Federal Courts, mindful of these concerns, seemed
reluctant to engage in any in-depth review of merits questions at certification
stage. A number of courts relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Eisen and
Carlisle & Jacqueline, in which the Court read Rule 23 as not authorizing the
certifying judge to carry out a ‘preliminary inquiry’ into the merits of the lawsuit
to decide on certification55 on the ground that such a ruling would unduly
advantage the plaintiff by offering him or her a determination on the merits of his
or her case without satisfying the certification criteria and hamper the defendant’s
right to be tried with the assistance of all the safeguards of a full trial.56 For
instance, the 9th Circuit held in Re:Telephone Charges, concerning an allegation of
price fixing in the hospitality industry, that the certification inquiry should be
limited to the question of whether the Rule 23(b)(3) conditions had been met in
each case:57 while this examination normally required consideration of the factual
and legal questions raised in the complaint, it could not go as far as to decide
which of the parties was likely to succeed in the litigation. 58
Later decisions, however, made clear that the ‘cautious’ approach adopted in
Eisen should be limited to questions concerning the allocation of notice costs.59
The US Supreme Court explained that certification decisions inevitably ‘involve
considerations that are enmeshed in the factual and legal issues comprising the
plaintiff’s cause of action’60 and consequently, may require the judge deciding on
certification to ‘probe behind the pleadings’,61 with a more scrupulous inquiry
whose outcome can be modified at a later stage when deciding on the merits of
the case.62 As a result, in Blades v. Monsanto, a case concerning allegations of
price-fixing, the 8th Circuit of the Court of Appeals took the view that to
determine whether common questions predominated over individual ones, the
54 See e.g. Eisen v. Carlisle and Jacqueline, 417 US 156 at 177; for commentary, see e.g. Samuel M. Hill,
Small claimants and class actions: deterrence and due process examined, 19 Am. J. Tr. Advoc. 147,
150–152(1995–1996) ; also Evans, “The new consensus on class certification”, Occasional Paper,
January 2009, available at: http://ssrn. com/abstract=1330594, pp. 2-3.
55 Eisen, supra n. 73, at 177-178. See also, inter alia, Re: Potash Antitrust Litigation, 159 FRD 682 at
688–689.
56 Id. at 178. See also, inter alia, Re: Potash Antitrust Litigation, 159 FRD 682 at 688–689.
57 In Re: Hotel Telephone Charges, 500 F. 2d 86 at 90.
58 Id., at 91–92.
59 See e.g.mutatis mutandis, In re: Initial Public Offerings Securities Litigation, 471 F 3d 24 at 39-41; also
General Tel. Co of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 US 147 at 160; more recently, see In re: Live Concert
Antitrust Litigation, 247 FRD 98 at 107.
60 Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 US 463 at 469.
61 Id. See also Falcon, supra n. 59, at 160.
62 Falcon, supra n. 78, at 160-161.
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Court would have to ‘conduct a limited preliminary inquiry, looking behind the
pleadings’, on whether in light of the factual circumstances of the case, ‘if the
plaintiffs’ general allegations are true, common evidence could suffice to make out
a prima facie case for the class.’ 63
Although the Court recognized that this appraisal could require ‘dabbling’ in
the merits of the case, it emphasized that its scope would be limited to what was
‘necessary to determine the nature of the evidence’ prima facie supporting the
class’s case and be especially cautious when touching on issues at the core of the
dispute.64 The Court looked closely at the expert evidence offered by the named
plaintiff and held that impact could not be ‘assumed’ on the basis of a mere
presumption that that the conspiracy had been implemented in a way which was
‘consistent’ across the whole class.65 It took this view due to the inconsistencies
affecting supply and demand conditions and to the ‘localised’ nature of the
industries affected, antitrust impact could not be proven via class-wide evidence,66
thus precluding certification. 67 Although it was couched in relatively ‘cautious’
and ‘moderate’ language, the Blades decision had a significant impact on later case
law, by laying down the standards governing the inquiry as to the commonality
and the predominance of common over individual issues in antitrust class
complaints.68
The 1st Circuit of the Court of Appeals held in Re: New Motor Vehicles, a class
complaint concerning allegations of a suppliers’ conspiracy to prevent the
unofficial imports of cheaper Canadian cars into the US, that while antitrust claims
seldom presented difficulties in establishing the commonality of factual and legal
questions they may be more problematic when it came to considering the
‘predominance’ of common over individual questions.69 In that case, the class
plaintiff sought an injunction against the manufacturers alleging threatened
antitrust injury under Section 4 of the Clayton Act. After having concurred with
the district court on the findings of adequacy of representation, numerosity and
commonality of issues of law and fact, the Court turned to consider the
‘predominance’ condition and held, citing Blades, that this assessment should
require a far more searching inquiry than that adopted in Eisen,70 encompassing
63 400 F. 3d 552 at 566.
64 Id., at 567.
65 Id., at 570.
66 Id.
67 Id., at 569-570.
68 For commentary, see e.g. Nagareda, “Common answers for class certification”,Vanderbilt Public Law
Research Paper No 10-33 at 4-5 and 15-16.
69 In Re:New MotorVehicles Canadian Antitrust Litigation, 522 F3d 6 at 18–19.
70 Id., at 19–20.
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the question of whether ‘the fact of antitrust violation and the fact of antitrust
impact [could] be established via common proof ’.71
It was recognized that the nature of the ‘predominance’ inquiry had been
shifting for some time from a ‘less probing’ scrutiny to a more searching
examination of the arguments and expert evidence deployed by the parties.72
Thus, the Court took the view that its appraisal should extend ‘beyond the
pleadings’, even when this overlapped with merits questions, to ensure that costly
and time-consuming class litigation would only be allowed where ‘appropriate’,
i.e. where it was capable of delivering benefits of efficiency and fairness in
adjudication. 73 It was emphasized the ‘novel’ and ‘complex’ nature of the theory
proposed by the plaintiffs and stated that only a ‘rigorous’ and ‘searching’ inquiry
would have been sufficient to fulfil the function of the predominance criterion. 74
On that basis, the decision was reversed75 on the ground that the plaintiff had
failed to establish that their ‘presentation of the case [could have been made]
through means amenable to the class action mechanism’, i.e. upon class-wide
evidence as to all the elements of an antitrust infringement.76 The Court stressed
that it was not ‘looking (…) for hard factual proof but for a more thorough
explanation of how the pivotal evidence behind plaintiff’s theory [could] be
established.’77
It is difficult to downplay the importance of the Blades and the Re: New
Motors decisions: some commentators read these judgments as limiting certification
to those complaints that were truly suited to class adjudication because they would
not have required individualized determination of key elements of the alleged
antitrust infringement.78 Other authors, instead, argued that the novelty of the
economic arguments raised by the class plaintiff to argue that he or she had
suffered harm common to the class may have weighed heavily in the court’s
decision to adopt a cautious approach to the ‘predominance’ inquiry.79
71 Id., at 20.
72 Id., at 22.
73 Id., at 25.
74 Id., at 25–26.
75 Id., at 21.
76 Id., at 29.
77 Id.
78 See id., at 27–28; also Blades, supra n. 63, at 570. For commentary, see e.g. R. Marcus, Reviving judicial
gatekeeping of aggregation: scrutinizing class certification, 79 George Washington L. Rev. 324, 353–354,
359–360 (2011); also Bozanic, Striking an efficient balance: making sense of antitrust standing in class action
certification motions, Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law, Legal Studies Research
Paper No 17-2010, available at: http://ssrn. com/abstract=1556016 at 34-35.
79 See e.g. Nagareda, Common answers for class certification, Vanderbilt Public Law Research Paper No
10-33 at 15–16; also James F. Nieberding & Robin Cantor, Price dispersion and class certification in
antitrust cases: an economic analysis, 14 J. Leg. Econ. 61, 65–66 (2007) .
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Later decisions80 suggest that the ‘rigorous inquiry’ adopted in New Motors has
come to govern the predominance inquiry also in cases concerning very serious
allegations of anti-competitive practices.81Re: Hydrogen Peroxide arose from
allegations of price-fixing made by a number of direct purchasers, who sought
certification under Rule 23(b)(3) alleging loss arising from a prima facie
overcharge. The respondents however, appealed against the District Court’s
decision granting certification on the ground that the ‘predominance’ condition
had not been fulfilled.82 The 3rd Circuit of the Court of Appeals took the view
that all the elements of an antitrust claim should be amenable to class-wide proof
for the purpose of granting certification and emphasized that this would be crucial
for the antitrust injury, which for its very nature often required individual, as
opposed to collective proof.83 Thus, the Court held that, although the named
plaintiff was not obliged to prove the existence of injury at such an early stage of
litigation, since this matter could only be decided after a full trial,84 it was
incumbent on him or her to show that this, along with the other indispensable
features of an antitrust claim, was ‘capable of proof at trial through evidence that
[was] common to the class rather than individual to its members’,85 having regard
especially to the ‘method or methods [being] proposed to (…) prove impact’ at
trial.86
In light of the above, the Court of Appeals vacated the District Court’s
certification decision: it was held that the judge seized with the admissibility of the
class complaint should determine ‘how’ the proposed collective claim will be tried
in court87 and especially answer the question of whether, ‘on a preponderance of
evidence’, all the certification requirements and especially the predominance
condition have been fulfilled.88
Having regard especially to antitrust damages’ claims, it was observed that the
fact that these lawsuits were generally well-suited for class treatment did not
authorize the District Court to ‘relax’ its certification analysis. Instead, the
certifying judge remained obliged to apply the ‘rigorous’ inquiry standards,
elaborated in Blades and to ‘weigh in’ the arguments raised by each party89 and, in
that context, to test the credibility and soundness of the expert evidence adduced
80 See e.g. In Re: Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litigation, 552 F3d 305; also, mutatis mutandis, Wal-Mart
Stores Inc v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541.
81 In Re: Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litigation, 552 F3d 305.
82 Id., at 310.
83 Id.
84 Id., at 311.
85 Id., at 312.
86 Id.
87 Id., at 318.
88 Id., at 319.
89 Id., at 321–322.
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in their support.90 On that basis, the appellate court accepted as ‘plausible’ the
conclusion that the alleged conspiracy may ‘in theory, impact the entire class
despite a decrease in price for some customers’, occurring at different times and
for different amounts.91 However, it emphasized that the District Court had
endorsed ‘uncritically’ the method proposed by the plaintiff to explain how all the
elements of the alleged breach, including antitrust impact, could have been proven
on a class-wide basis.92
The Court of Appeals took the view that the certifying judge, instead, should
have considered whether the thesis he proposed could have been reconciled with
apparently contrasting evidence, pointing instead to the absence of common
impact across the class.93 Having regard especially to the ‘predominance’ inquiry,
the 3rd Circuit dismissed the certifying judge’s approach and held94 that the
District Court should have addressed more openly the question of whether,
despite the pricing and supply differences that had been alleged, the element of
antitrust harm could have been established via the common theoretical framework
proposed by the plaintiff’s expert witness.95 The appellate court made clear that
this appraisal should not have been withheld on the sole ground that it could
‘overlap’ with the merits of the case; instead, it emphasized that such a careful
scrutiny of the class complaint was required by the very function of the
requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) FRCP and would in any event have been open to
full review at the merits’ stage.96
It is argued that the Court of Appeals started a ‘minor revolution’ in the
approach to the certification inquiry in antitrust claims, by moving from a
relatively ‘trusting’ attitude to the appraisal of specific complaints to a far more
searching approach to questions of ‘predominance’ of common over individual
issues with a view to determining whether the claim is ‘well-suited’ to class
litigation, not just in theory but in practice.97 It is submitted that this approach is
consistent with the function of the certification courts as ‘gatekeepers’ of the
90 Id., at 323.
91 Id.
92 Id., at 325.
93 Id.
94 Id., at 326.
95 Id., at 325.
96 Id., at 324.
97 See especially Wal-Mart Stores Inc v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, especially pp. 2547–2551 and 2555–2557;
for commentary, e.g. Nagareda, Common answers for class certification,Vanderbilt Public Law Research
Paper No 10-33 at 15-16; also James F.Nieberding & Robin Cantor, Price dispersion and class certification
in antitrust cases: an economic analysis, 14 J. Leg. Econ. 61, 65–66 (2007) ; most recently, see Malveaux,
Class actions at the crossroads: an answer to Wal-Mart v Dukes, The Catholic University of America,
Columbus School of Law, Legal Studies Series, paper No 2011-6, available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=1791743, pp. 21 ff.
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certification process and with the ‘exceptional’ nature of class litigation,98 which
should be confined to those disputes which, due to the nature of the complaint, to
the evidence and pleas made by the parties, are truly capable of being fairly and
effectively adjudicated by representation. 99
However, it is undisputable that enhancing the judicial discretion in this
appraisal is likely to have a significant impact on the actual availability of
certification. 100 Commenting on Re: Hydrogen Peroxide, some authors welcomed
the rigorous scrutiny standard, on the ground that it would act as a ‘filter’ to ensure
that the class litigation device be available only to ‘meritorious’ claims101 and
would therefore contribute to the overall fairness of the judicial proceedings:102 on
this point, it was argued that since certification often constituted the ‘trigger event’
for starting settlement negotiations, restricting it to cases that were at least suitable
for class treatment would prevent the defendant from being exposed to sometimes
extensive threats of liability in ‘dubious’ cases. 103
Other commentators, however, objected to the application of such a strict
attitude to certification especially to antitrust cases on the ground that it may
discourage claimants from filing new claims.104 Evans argued that by requiring
plaintiff counsel to spell out all his or her arguments and evidence at such an early
stage would, on the one hand, force claimants to seek out complex and costly
technical evidence without the benefits of full discovery105 and, on the other
hand, allow economically powerful defendants to exploit the bias built in the
98 Wal-Mart, supra n. 97, at 2550. For commentary, see inter alia, Malveaux,Class actions at the crossroads: an
answer to Wal-Mart v Dukes, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law, Legal
Studies Series, paper No 2011-6, available at http://ssrn. com/abstract=1791743, pp. 21 ff.
99 Id. See also Re: Hydrogen Peroxide, supra n. 81, at 320–321.
100 Id. at 373; see also pp. 359–361.
101 See e.g. Sarah Rajski, In Re: hydrogen Peroxide: reinforcing rigorous analysis for class action certification, 34
Seattle U.L. Rev. 577, 603–604 (2011) ; Robert G.Bone and David S. Evans, Class certification and the
substantive merits, 51 Duke L. J. 1251, 1328–1330; Nagareda, Common answers for class certification,
Vanderbilt Public Law Research Paper No 10-33 at 18–19; see also Bozanic, Striking an efficient balance:
making sense of antitrust standing in class action certification motions, Pennsylvania State University
Dickinson School of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper No 17-2010, available at: http: ssrn.
com/abstract=1556016 at 34-35.
102 Id., p. 4.
103 See e.g. mutatis mutandis, In Re: Rhone Poulenc Rohrer, 51 F3d 1293 at 1298 (per Posner J); for
commentary, see e.g. Jacobson & Choi, Curtailing the impact of class certification on antitrust policy, 66
NYUANSAL 549, 554–555 (2011) . Cf. e.g. Silver, We’re scared to death: does class certification subject
defendants to blackmail?, University of Texas School of Law, Public Law and Legal Theory Research
Paper No 043, available at: http://ssrn. com/abstract_id=334900, pp. 3-4.
104 See inter alia, mutatis mutandis, Gentry, Bathke v Casey’s General Stores, Inc: redefining the appropriateness of
class certification in antitrust cases, 22 J. Corp. L. 115, 128 (1996–1997); also Samuel M. Hill, Small
claimants and class actions: deterrence and due process examined, (1995–1996) 19 Am. J. Tr. Advoc. 147,
150–152; See e.g. Silver, We’re scared to death: does class certification subject defendants to blackmail?,
University of Texas School of Law, Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No 043, available at:
http://ssrn. com/abstract_id=334900, especially pp. 21-23, 37-38 and 53-54.
105 Evans, The new consensus on class certification, Occasional Paper, January 2009, available at: http://ssrn.
com/abstract=1330594, pp. 2-3.
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system in their favour in order to make this phase of the litigation lengthier and
costlier.106 Thus, it was suggested that an overtly cautious certification inquiry
could de facto jeopardize the goals of antitrust litigation by denying their ‘day in
court’ to those claimants that it was designed to assist.107
It was added that this outcome could be exacerbated by the ongoing
tendency of the US federal Courts – partly motivated by concerns arising from
the role of class counsel in these cases – to adopt a narrow interpretation of the
substantive rules governing liability under Section 4 of the Clayton Act108 and to
require prospective claimants to spell out a ‘plausible’ prima facie claim as to the
relief being sought,109 allegedly to avoid ‘settlement blackmail’.110 As a result, it
was argued that while the rationale for class litigation of antitrust issues remains in
itself sound, unduly complicating the admissibility and the certification stages
could dissuade potential class representatives to access the Courts.111
In light of the above, it is concluded that the ‘scrupulous’ approach to the
certification inquiry developed by the US higher Federal Courts in respect to
antitrust claims has increasingly acted as a filtering mechanism designed to limit
class treatment only to those claims that are truly suitable to being litigated via
representation. Together with the assessment of the existence of a prima facie
allegation of antitrust injury, this appraisal contributes to allowing the certifying
court to act as an effective ‘gatekeeper’ by limiting access to justice under Rule
23(b)(3) only to meritorious group claims grounded in Section 4 of the Clayton
Act. Consequently, it is argued that the Commission’s claim that opt-out class
actions would not deliver on goals of efficient, yet at the same time fair
adjudication seems at least questionable.
2.4 ‘WHO’ CAN SUE? THE NAMED PLAINTIFF AND CLASS COUNSEL IN THE CONTEXT
OF CLASS CERTIFICATION: THE REQUIREMENTS OF ‘TYPICALITY’ AND OF
‘ADEQUACY OF REPRESENTATION’
After having discussed the current trends characterizing the commonality and
predominance inquiry in class certification decision adopted by the US Federal
Courts, this section will focus on the identity and the qualities of the
106 See e.g. Silver, We’re Scared to Death: Does Class Certification Subject Defendants to Blackmail?, University
ofTexas School of Law, Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No 043, available at: http://ssrn.
com/abstract_id=334900, especially pp. 53-54.
107 See e.g. Samuel M. Hill, Small Claimants and Class Actions: Deterrence and Due Process Examined, 19 Am.
J.Tr.Advoc. 147, 150–152 (1995–1996) .
108 Jacobson & Choi, supra n. 103, at 555-556; see Verizon Telecommunications Inc v. Legal Offices of Curtis V
Trinko LLP, 540 US 398 at, e.g., 413-414.
109 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 US 544 at 557–558.
110 Id., at 558–559.
111 See e.g. Jacobson & Choi, supra n. 103, at 563–564.
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representative plaintiff and of his or her counsel for the purpose of certification. It
is well known that one of the long-standing arguments brought against opt-out
class actions arises from the perceived lack of supervision of class counsel on the
part of both the named plaintiff and the class as a whole, as a result of which
counsel may be tempted to act in his or her own interest and not in that of the
class.112 Consequently, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, by requiring that the
representative’s claims be ‘typical’ to those of the class, have sought to ensure the
fair and effective vindication of the rights of each class member.113 In addition, the
class representative must show that they will be able to ‘fairly and adequately’
represent the class by employing counsel sufficiently ‘competent’ to litigate the
action of not just his or her client but also the whole class’s interests.114
According to the requirement of ‘typicality’ the class representative must ‘be
part of the class and possess the same interests and suffer the same injury as the
class members’,115 the ‘most prominent consideration’ being the ‘absence of an
adverse interest between the representative parties and other members of the
class’.116 As with other certification requirements, the ‘typicality’ inquiry varies in
relation to the type of antitrust breach being alleged and will normally focus on
‘whether other members of the class have the same or similar injury, whether the
action is based on conduct which is not special or unique to the named plaintiffs
and whether other class members have been injured’ in the same way as a result of
the same practice.117 Thus, in respect to price-fixing allegations, it was held that
since the complaint had arisen from the implementation of the same common
scheme and the complainants were all ‘typical purchasers’ of the relevant products,
the claim brought by the representative plaintiff was ‘fairly encompassed’ by the
claims common to the class, despite the differences existing among individual
members in terms of, inter alia, size or location. 118
This appraisal can, however, become more complex in respect to antitrust
allegations arising from, for instance, vertical practices: class complaints concerning
franchising agreements have raised difficult questions, especially when collective
lawsuits have involved both current and past (i.e., terminated) franchisees. For
112 See 2011 Consultation document, p. 18.
113 See e.g. East Texas Motor Freight Co Inc v. Rodriguez, 431 US 395 at 403; also Califano v.Yamasaki, 442
US 682 at 700–701;GeneralTelephone Co of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 US 147 at 160 for commentary see
e.g. Issacharoff, “Governance and legitimacy in the law of class actions”, (1999) Supreme Court
Review 337 at 390; also Newberg, 4th Ed., sect. 3:13, pp. 317–318.
114 See e.g. N. C. Scott, Don’t forget me! The client in a class action lawsuit, 15 Geo. J Leg. Ethics 561,
569–570, 573–574 (2001), ; also Newberg, 4th Ed., sect. 3:21, p. 40. See e.g. Marcera v. Chinlund, 595
F2d 1231 at 1239; also Gonzalez v. Cassidy, 474 F2d 67 at 72-73.
115 GeneralTelephone Co of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 US 147 at 156.
116 Re: Catfish Antitrust Litigation, 826 F Supp 1019 at 1034.
117 Id., at 1036.
118 Id. See also In Re:NASDAQ, 169 FRD 493 at 510-511.
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instance, in Meineke the 4th Circuit of the Court of Appeals found that a ‘conflict of
interests’ existed between the named plaintiff and part of the proposed class119 on
the ground that there were significant differences as to the content of the contracts
concluded by the defendant with individual class members.120 Consequently, it
was found that the interests of some would be plaintiffs were inconsistent with
those of others, including the named claimant’s, and that this conflict was
especially apparent in respect to the remedy being sought.121 The typicality
appraisal is also often complex as regards allegedly unlawful tying claims: it was
held in several decisions that in these cases the named plaintiff’s complaint could
be considered ‘typical’ to the class if it could be proven via evidence of contractual
practices that were applied in the same way across the class, for instance because
the class complaint stemmed from the generalized stipulation of standardized
contracts.122
The adequacy of representation requirement, instead, shifts the focus of the
certification inquiry to the ‘competency of class counsel’; it ensures that the action
can be ‘vigorously litigated’ and thereby secure the due process rights of the absent
plaintiffs by means of the services of ‘qualified counsel’,123 i.e. of a lawyer who is
sufficiently ‘qualified, experienced and generally able to conduct the proposed
litigation (…)’.124 In particular, this requirement seeks to avoid that the named
plaintiff become ‘involved in a collusive suit’ with the defendant or in any event
hold interests that are antagonistic to those of the class.125 Fulfilling this condition
is particularly important in antitrust cases, due to their complexity and,
consequently, to the need to ensure that these claims are litigated by sufficiently
proficient counsel.126 At the same time however the Courts have acknowledged
that these objectives should be reconciled with the need to allow access to justice
to all the victims of antitrust breaches: it was especially feared that an increased
reliance on the ‘adequacy’ of class representative condition could stifle future class
119 Broussard v.Meineke Discount Mufflers Shops, Inc, 155 F3d 331 at 336-338.
120 Id., at 339–340.
121 Id.; see also, mutatis mutandis, Duchardt v. Midland National Life Insurance Co Inc, 235 FRD 436 at 445.
For commentary, see e.g. Marcus, Reviving judicial gatekeeping of aggregation: scrutinizing the merits of class
actions, 79 GWL.Rev. 324, 344–345 (2011).
122 See e.g. Re:Apple iPod/iTunes Antitrust Litigation, (2008), unrep,WL 5574487, decision of Dec. 22,
2008, at 3, 5-6; also Freedland v.AT &T, 238 FRD 130 at 141.
123 See Newberg, 4th Ed., sect. 3:21, p. 40; also, Scott, supra n. 114,, pp. 573-574. See e.g. Marcera v.
Chinlund, 595 F2d 1231 at 1239; also Gonzalez v. Cassidy, 474 F2d 67 at 72–73.
124 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacqueline, 391 F2d 551 at 562.
125 Id.
126 Kirkpatrick v. JC Bradford & Co, 827 F2d 718 at 727. See also, inter alia,Dolgow v.Anderson, 43 FRD 472
at 494; In Re: Catfish Antitrust Litigation, 826 F Supp 1019 at 1037-138; Lewis v. NFL, 146 FRD 5 at
10. For commentary, inter alia, Newberg, 4th Ed., sect. 18:11 at p. 18:36-37; also Scott, supra n. 114,
pp. 571–572.
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complaints by placing the named claimant under an excessively onerous obligation
to ‘take an active part’ in the litigation. 127
In light of the above analysis, it is concluded that the Commission’s assertions
that lodging a class action under Rule 23(b)(3) FRCP is an option open to
‘anyone’ sound very difficult to justify. It is argued that the inquiry into the
typicality and the adequacy of representation place appropriate limits to the
availability of collective litigation, for the purpose of avoiding ‘misalignments of
interests’ between the named plaintiffs and the class and of securing appropriate
levels of professional competency in conducting the proceedings,128 thus
upholding the fairness of representative litigation. 129
3 ‘OPT OUT’ACTIONS AND COLLECTIVE ANTITRUST
COMPLAINTS:A ‘CLASS ACTION’ FOR EU COMPETITION LAW
LITIGATION?
3.1 THE APPLICATION OF RULE 23(B)(3) TO ANTITRUST CASES: LEARNING LESSONS
FROM THE CASE LAW OF THE US FEDERAL COURTS IN RESPECT TO CLASS
CERTIFICATION?
The previous sections briefly examined some of the aspects of certification in
antitrust cases and emphasized how the conditions laid down in Rule 23(b)(3)
have acted as an effective ‘screening’ mechanism to ensure that only those claims
that can be appropriately, efficiently and fairly litigated by representation can
actually benefit from class treatment.130 Against this background it could
legitimately be questioned whether the Commission’s ongoing refusal to discuss
‘US style’ class actions as one of the options for the framing of collective redress
remedies in EU law, for the purpose of furthering goals of access to justice and of
compensation of harm caused by anti-competitive practices, is tenable. It is argued
that the scrutiny conducted by the certifying courts over new class complaints can
effectively deal with the concerns voiced by the Commission. Consequently, it will
now be considered whether, if they are assisted by similarly exacting requirements
as to the ‘suitability’ of the claim to adjudication via representation, actions akin to
127 See e.g. in Re: Discovery Zone Securities Litigation, 169 FRD 104 at 108-109; also Kirkpatrick, supra
n. 126, at 727; Re: Catfish, supra n. 126, at 1037-1038; Lewis, supra n. 126, at 11-12.
128 Id. See also,mutatis mutandis,Edison v. EEOC, 446 US 318 at 331.
129 Falcon, supra n. 115, at 157, fn. 13.
130 See e.g. mutatis mutandis, Falcon, supra n. 115, at 157, fn. 13. For commentary, see inter alia, John C.
Coffee, Understanding the plaintiff’s attorney: the implications of economic theory for the private enforcement of
law through class and derivative actions, 86 C. L. Rev. 669 at 677–679 (1986); also inter alia,Blum v. Stenson,
465 US 886 at 900.
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the US style opt-out lawsuits could be considered as a possible option in the
discussion of these questions within the spectrum of EU law.
3.2 COLLECTIVE ACTIONS IN EU COMPETITION LAW: CURRENT ISSUES AND
FUTURE CHALLENGES
It was illustrated above that although boosting the rate of private competition
enforcement constitutes a major concern for the EU Commission, its position has
always been set against including opt-out actions as one of the ‘suitable options’ to
this end.131 On the basis of the examination of the more recent case law of the US
higher Federal Courts in the field of class certification of collective antitrust
complaints,132 it will now be considered whether ‘opt out’-type actions could be
‘made to fit’ within the principles (and the limits) of EU competition law, as well
as in the wider context of the whole spectrum of tort law, as envisaged by the
Commission itself.133
It was anticipated that according to the Commission, the eminently
‘compensatory’ nature of competition damages’ actions would be incompatible
with the provision of ‘incentive to sue’, such as not only the award of ‘enhanced
compensation’ (e.g., via a damages multiplier) but also of the availability of class
actions.134 In its 2008White Paper the Commission suggested that the potentially
broad scope of the proposed classes would be likely to turn the Crehan damages
remedy from a ‘restorative’ tool into an instrument for the financial punishment of
anti-competitive behaviour.135 It was argued that even without the presence of a
damages’ multiplier the threat of financial exposure arising from allowing a
collective claim to proceed via representation would have a ‘blackmail effect’ on
defendants that may not be compatible with the rationale assigned to these actions
by EU law.136
Additional concerns were raised in respect to the implications that similar
actions could have on the litigation systems existing in individual Member States.
131 See 2008White Paper, section 2.1.
132 See e.g. In Re: Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litigation, 552 F3d 305; also, mutatis mutandis, Wal-Mart
Stores Inc v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541.
133 See 2011 Consultation document, para. 18.
134 See e.g. Impact assessment document accompanying the 2008White Paper, paras 286–288.
135 2008White Paper, section 2.2; see also Impact Assessment document, paras 21–22.
136 See Joined Cases 295-298/99,Manfredi v. Lloyd Adriatico and others [2006] ECR I-6619 at paras 58–59,
62–63; see also 2005 StaffWorking Document, paras 198-201; see also mutatis mutandis, In Re: Rhone
Poulenc Rohrer, 51 F3d 1293 at 1298 (per Posner J); for commentary, see e.g. Jacobson and Choi,
Curtailing the impact of class certification on antitrust policy, 66 NYUANSAL 549, 554–555 (2011) . Cf. e.g.
Silver, We’re scared to death: does class certification subject defendants to blackmail?, University of Texas
School of Law, Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No 043, available at: http://ssrn.
com/abstract_id=334900, pp. 3–4.
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As is well known, the Commission took the view in its 2004 Green Paper that
opt-in and representative actions would constitute the only ‘appropriate’
mechanisms for collective redress in EU competition law since they would remain
consistent with ‘traditional’ patterns of litigation throughout the Member States.137
These views were recently confirmed in respect to collective tort claims generally:
in its 2011 Consultation Paper on collective redress the Commission expressed the
view that opt-out lawsuits would not be compatible with the ‘European legal
tradition’.138 It is however legitimate to query what this ‘tradition’ actually entails
in respect to group litigation: are these ‘European’ litigation patterns still strongly
linked to principles of ‘personality’ and of individual’s control over one’s
litigation? Or have they changed in response to the changing demands of a society
in which ‘diffuse’ torts, having a wide-ranging impact, are increasingly common?
It should be emphasized that a number of national legislatures throughout the
Union have introduced mechanisms for collective redress of diffuse torts in their
jurisdictions, some of which resemble quite closely the US style opt-out class
actions. Norway, for instance, has allowed both opt-in and opt-out class actions
since January 2008, subject to a requirement similar to the notion of
‘commonality’ and, in the case of opt-out certification, of a requirement to give
notice. In particular, opt-out actions are expressly reserved for ‘low value’ claims,
which would otherwise be unlikely to reach the courts.139
Similar rules were enacted in 2005 by the Dutch Parliament, albeit only to
allow for the collective settlement of tort actions:140 the proposed settlements are
scrutinized by the Amsterdam Court of Appeals which decides whether they are
‘fair’ and whether the class of those affected by the harmful practices has been
accurately and fairly identified.141 If it approves the settlement, the Court sets a
time limit to allow the named plaintiff to notify the class members and thereby
enable them to opt-out of the class.142 Furthermore, Portuguese legislation has
allowed ‘popular actions’ since 1995: these actions follow the opt-out model and
permit the named plaintiff to represent ‘on his own initiative and without the need
for a mandate or express authorization, all the holders of the rights and interests in
question’, subject to the requirement of notice and to the right, conferred on all
137 2004 Green Paper, section 2.5; see also 2005 StaffWorking Document, paras 200–201.
138 2011 Consultation document, para. 17.
139 Norwegian Disputes Act (No 90/2005), Chapter 35; see R. Gaudet, Turning a Blind Eye: The
Commission’s Rejection of Opt Out Class Actions Overlooks Swedish, Norwegian, Danish and Dutch
experience, 30 Eur. Competition L.Rev. 107, 112 (2009) .
140 Dutch Code of Civil Procedure,Artt. 1013-1018.
141 Art. 1016; see Gaudet, supra n. 140, at p. 114.
142 Gaudet, supra n. 140, p. 115.
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the class members, to opt-out of the action. 143 Article 17 of Law No. 83/1995
confers special powers to the courts, by enabling them to collect evidence on their
own initiative and suspend the effects of the final decision in the event of an
appeal against it.144 Also, if the named plaintiff decides to abandon the lawsuit or
holds interests in conflict with those of the class, the Public Prosecutor is allowed
to step in the proceedings and conduct the litigation on behalf of the class, thus
relieving the representative claimant.145
The class action introduced by the Italian Parliament is broadly similar: Law
No 99/2009, in force since January 2010, provides for an American style class
action by empowering individuals to institute representative proceedings on behalf
to all those who have been equally adversely affected by the same piece of
allegedly harmful conduct.146 The Act also strengthens the judicial powers of
scrutiny on the admissibility and the case management of these claims147 and
prevents the defendant from seeking to resolve the dispute out of court once the
claim has been authorized to proceed as a class action, to prevent settlement
blackmail.148 Importantly, Article 49 thereof precludes any claimant belonging to
the class who did not opt-out of the original collective lawsuit from lodging a
claim against the defendant in respect to the same legal and factual issues that have
already been dealt with, thus recognizing res judicata effect to the class
judgment.149
It is suggested that these recent legislative developments may be read not only
as evidence of a recognition of the importance of collective actions as a means of
protecting the rights and interests of individuals affected by the consequences of
economic behaviour having a diffuse harmful impact, such as competition
infringements.150 They can also be regarded as potentially contradicting the
Commission’s views that opt-out class actions would be inconsistent with the
rules governing civil litigation in the Member States. It should be emphasized that
already in the 2008 White Paper the Commission had recognized the absence of
evidence of ‘abuses’ stemming from the application of the Dutch legislation
143 See Sousa Antunes, “Class actions, group litigation and other forms of collective litigation”, report
submitted to the Centre for Socio-Legal studies, University of Oxford (2007), available at:
http://www.law.stanford.edu/display/images/dynamic/events_media/Portugal_National_Report.pdf,
p. 6; see also pp. 10–11.
144 Id., pp. 11–12.
145 Id., p. 16.
146 See Naishi, Italy’s class action experiment, 43 Cornell Intl. L. J. 147, 168–170 (2010) .
147 Id., p. 168.
148 Id., p. 169.
149 Id., p. 165.
150 Inter alia, see Gaudet, supra n. 140 , pp. 119–120.
COLLECTIVE REDRESS IN EU COMPETITION LAW 551
commented above,151 linking it to the absence of other ‘incentives to sue’, such as
fee-shifting.152
Against this background, it may be questioned whether the Commission’s
ongoing preference for ‘opt in’ and ‘representative’ actions remains justifiable in
light of the motivations expressed in, inter alia, the 2008 White Paper. It is
acknowledged that in the absence of harmonization, the principle of national
autonomy allows the Member States to choose what type of collective remedy to
provide for the protection of rights grounded in EU law, including the right to
seek compensation for harm suffered as a result of ‘diffuse’ anti-competitive
behaviour. 153 However, it is suggested that, as the experience of the United
Kingdom has shown, restricting these options only to ‘opt in’ and ‘representative’
claims may not always provide the ‘right’, in the sense of most effective solution to
these questions.154 As is well known, Section 47A of the UK Competition Act
1998 confers on ‘recognised representative bodies’ the right to stand in judgment
and bring follow on actions (i.e., tort actions designed to recover damages arising
from anti-competitive behaviour for which the defendant has already been found
responsible by the Office of Fair Trading) for damages before the Competition
Appeals Tribunal.155 While this remedy does not prejudice the right to bring an
action for damages before the High Court according to the normal rules of
procedure, it is undeniable that the take up of new actions has remained very
low.156
Commenting on the only such case lodged with the CAT so far (and settled
out of court), i.e. the ‘Football Replica Kit’ price-fixing action,157 Leskinen
highlighted the difficulties associated with taking advantage of the opt-in action
model provided by the Competition Act and open to representative bodies.158 She
observed that the need to launch a ‘media campaign’ to attract adherents to the
action, taken together with the legal costs and the financial burden linked to
151 2008 staff working paper accompanying theWhite Paper, p. 17, fn. 24.
152 Id.; see also, inter alia, Rizzuto, supra n. 161, at 57–58.
153 See inter alia, Case 45/76,Comet BV v. Produktschap voor Siergewassen [1976] ECR 2043 at para. 13. See
e.g. Firat Cengiz, Antitrust damages’ action: lessons from Amercian indirect purchasers’ litigation,59 ICLQ 39,
55–56 (2010).
154 See e.g. Rodger, Competition law litigation in the UK courts: a study of all cases 1995-2008: Part I, 2
GCLR 93, 98–99 (2009) .
155 See e.g. Albion Water Ltd v. Dwr Cymru Cyfyngedig [2010] CAT 30; for commentary, see, inter alia,
Rodger, Private enforcement and the Enterprise Act: an exemplary system of awarding damages?, 24 Eur.
Competition L.Rev. 103 at 105 (2003); see also Lever, Restructuring courts and tribunals hearing UK and
EC competition cases, Competition L. J. 47 (2002) .
156 See Rodger, supra n. 155), pp. 98–101 (this study lists only 6 cases lodged with the High Court until
2005 and only one with the CAT, brought by a representative body, i.e. Consumers Association v. JJB
Sports (Re: Football Replica Kit), [2009] CAT 2.
157 Consumers Association v. JJB Sports (Re: Football Replica Kit), [2009] CAT 2.
158 Leskinen, Recent developments on collective antitrust damages actions in the EU, 4 GCLR 79 at
80–81(2011).
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acquiring evidence contributed to making this remedy unattractive.159
Consequently, it is perhaps not surprising that individual litigants have sought to
overcome the shortcomings of the current framework by seeking to rely on
existing, generally applicable procedural rules, such as the right to bring actions on
behalf of other claimants sharing a ‘common interest and a common grievance’,
provided in Rule 19(6) of the Crown Procedural Rules (CPR).160 It is suggested
that the Emerald Supplies litigation constitutes one such attempt.
The limited purvey of this work does not allow for a detailed examination of
this case. It is reminded that Emerald Supplies arose from an action brought by
several flower traders in the English Courts. The plaintiffs sought to recover
damages against the respondent on the ground that they had allegedly been
adversely affected by the price-fixing conspiracy, for which BA had been placed
under investigation by the Office for Fair Trading.161
In their claim the plaintiffs also asserted to be representatives of all other
purchasers of BA’s freight services who had allegedly paid inflated prices on the
ground that they had shared the same interests, having been affected by the same
unlawful practice.162 However, the action was dismissed on the ground that the
plaintiffs had failed to show the existence of a ‘common interest’ and of a
‘common grievance’ for all the members of the proposed class at all stages of
litigation, so that the remedy being sought would be ‘beneficial to all’, as required
by Rule 19(6) of the Crown Procedural Rules, on which the ‘representative
element’ of their claim had been based.163
Morritt J, for the Chancery Division, held that since the question of whether a
shared interest existed across the class hinged on the issue of the existence of
damages’ liability,164 until the case had been decided on the merits, the court would
have been in no position to determine who had been affected by the defendant’s
unlawful behaviour and as a result what the confines of the proposed class would
have been. 165 Lord Justice Mummery, for the Court ofAppeal, concurred and added
that since the proposed class comprised both direct and indirect purchasers, whose
legal positions were likely to have been affected in different ways as a result of the
allegedly unlawful practice,166 a ‘conflict of interests’ would have probably emerged,
thus preventing representative litigation.167
159 Id., p. 80.
160 See e.g. Mulheron, Recent milestones in class action reform in England: a critique and a proposal, 127 (Apr)
LQR 288 at 293–294 (2011) .
161 See e.g. [2010] EWCA Civ 1284 at para. 60.
162 Id., at para. 61.
163 Id., at para. 33; see also [2009] EWHC 741 (Ch), at paras 34–35.
164 [2009] EWHC 741 (Ch) at para. 35.
165 Id., paras 35–36.
166 [2010] EWCA Civ 1284 at 62–63.
167 Id., at 63–64.
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The Emerald Supplies case was widely debated and the limited remit of this
work does not allow for its detailed discussion. 168 It should however be
emphasized that the litigation represented an attempt to rely on existing domestic
rules of procedure to redress the harmful consequences of conduct allegedly
incompatible with the UK and EU competition rules to which it was felt that no
satisfactory response, especially in compensation terms, could be provided under
domestic law.169 On this point, it is suggested that the absence of an infringement
decision made it especially difficult for ‘low value’ claimants to lodge an action
collectively, given their inability to access the CAT under Section 47A of the
Competition Act 1998 and the corresponding difficulties associated with seeking
relief before the High Court.170 Consequently, it is not surprising that the Court
of Appeal’s dismissal of the action was criticized as a ‘lost opportunity’ to fill the
gaps existing in the system for the collective redress of ‘diffuse wrongs’, whether in
competition law or more generally in the law of torts.171
More generally, it could be argued that the Emerald Supplies litigation
represents a very apt example of the limitations of the private competition
enforcement framework available to prospective claimants before the English
courts and especially of the obstacles stemming from the choice, made in the
Competition Act, to limit the array of options only to certain types of collective
actions, namely opt-in and representative lawsuits. Accordingly, it may be queried
whether, had an ‘opt out’ action been available to the plaintiffs in this case, they
could have had a better chance of obtaining redress of the harm allegedly caused
to them by British Airways’ prima facie unlawful behaviour.
It is acknowledged that speculating on the suitability of opt-out action to
litigation before the English courts may not be entirely appropriate, given the
ongoing scepticism shown by several agencies as regards this type of group
actions.172 However, it is suggested that, as it is illustrated by the Emerald Supplies
decision, the High Court and the Court of Appeal have been willing to engage in
168 See e.g. Mulheron, Recent milestones in class action reform in England: a critique and a proposal, 127 (Apr)
LQR 288 (2011); Id., Emerald Supplies Ltd v. British Airways: a century later the ghost of Market lives on,
8 Competition L. J. 159 (2009); Hodges,Collective redress in Europe: the new model, 29 CJQ 370 (2010).
169 See most recently, Barling, Collective redress for breach of competition law—a case for reform?,
10 Competition L. J. 5 (2011) .
170 See e.g. Mulheron, A missed gem of an opportunity for the representative rule, University of Cambridge
Faculty of Law research paper No 18/2011, available at: http://papers.ssrn. com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=1837479, pp. 2-3.
171 Mulheron, supra n. 171), pp. 13–14.
172 See e.g. Lord Chancellor’s Department, “Representative claims: proposed new procedures” (February
2001), available at: http://www.dca.gov.uk/consult/general/repclaims.htm, paras 13 and 19-20; see
also Woolf, “Access to Justice: Final Report to the Lord Chancellor on the Civil Justice system in
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a scrupulous scrutiny of the complaint with a view to assessing whether it was
suitable to being adjudged by representation under CPR Rule 19(6) and thereby
addressing many of the concerns for the fairness and efficiency of this type of
litigation. 173
Although the action in question is different from the opt-out class action
regulated by Rule 23(b)(3) FRCP, it may be argued that the assessment conducted
in the Emerald Supplies decision shares some common traits with the certification
inquiry conducted by the US Federal Courts in their more recent case law. It is
submitted that the Chancery Division’s and the Court of Appeal’s concerns for
ensuring that all the class members share the same ‘grievance’ and that the remedy
being sought be ‘beneficial to all’ are broadly consistent with the assessment,
conducted, inter alia, by the US Court of Appeals to ensure the ‘cohesiveness’ of
the proposed class.174 In addition, the emphasis placed on the need to prevent
‘conflicts of interests’ between the class members as to the nature of the remedy
being sought, especially those conflicts arising from the different nature of their
claim or from the existence of individual defences, is also reminiscent of the
typicality inquiry.175 Thus, although the disappointment voiced by several
commentators as regards the outcome of Emerald Supplies is understandable, the
appraisal conducted at admissibility stage may cautiously be welcomed as a step
forward in reconciling, in each case, the goals of efficient adjudication and of
procedural fairness.176
In light of the above analysis it is concluded that, although the objectives of
fairness and efficiency in the adjudication of collective, often factually complex,
disputes, should guide any discussion in this area, the continuing scepticism shown
by the Commission as regards the ‘viability’ of US style opt-out actions in the EU
is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain, especially since it appears to be very
much ‘out of step’ vis-à-vis the status quo of the litigation rules existing in
individual European jurisdictions.
England and Wales”, 1996: London, HMSO, Chapter 17. For commentary, see inter alia Sorabji, “The
hidden class action in English civil procedure”, (2009) 28(4) CJQ 498, pp. 511-512.
173 See inter alia,Woolf, supra n. 173, Chapter 17, paras 6–7.
174 Inter alia, re: Hydrogen Peroxide, supra n. 100, at 321–322.
175 See e.g.GeneralTel. Co of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 US 147 at 160; more recently, see In re: Live Concert
Antitrust Litigation, 247 FRD 98 at 107.
176 See Mulheron, supra n. 171, at pp. 10-12.
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4 BETWEEN ‘REALISM’ AND ‘PREJUDICES’:TIME FOR AN OPEN
DISCUSSION ON THE COLLECTIVE REDRESS OF COMPETITION
INJURIES: AND BEYOND?TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS
The earlier sections discussed some of the issues and trends characterizing the
debate on the theme of private competition enforcement in the EU and especially
on the role of collective redress mechanisms as a means to boost access to justice
for parties affected by these ‘widespread’ injuries.177 It was emphasized that no
concrete measures have been adopted to either improve existing domestic
mechanisms or introduce new ones at EU level. While this outcome may be
regarded as broadly consistent with the principle of national autonomy,178 it was
argued that short of a ‘EU wide’ solution, the currently patchy and piecemeal
solutions adopted by individual Member States may not always allow claimants to
seek relief for small value and potentially numerous and thereby repetitive (if
lodged individually) claims.179 Therefore, it was suggested that the Commission’s
decision to take the debate on collective redress ‘out of the particular’, i.e. out of
specific policy fields, such as, inter alia, competition policy, and ‘into the general’, by
seeking to frame and propose possible options against the wider background of
tort law as a whole180 can be interpreted as evidence of its willingness to secure
consensus in support of a uniform, generally applicable set of rules governing
group civil lawsuits.181
However, what remains to some extent worrying is the restrictive range of
options identified by the Commission in this context: it was illustrated how the
2011 Consultation document expressly excluded opt-out class actions, ostensibly
in order to limit the risk of ‘abuse of process’ and, in respect to competition
actions, to uphold their ‘restorative’ function. 182 However, it was questioned
whether this position and the justifications adduced to support it are sustainable
today. It was illustrated how the US Federal Courts have increasingly relied on the
certification inquiry in order to identify only these claims that, according to Rule
177 See inter alia 2004 Green Paper, section 2.5; see also 2008 White Paper, paras 198–201; more recently,
2011 Consultation document, para. 4, 9.
178 See e.g. Swaak and Kortmann,“The EC White Paper on antitrust damages actions: why the Member
States are right to be (less than) enthusiastic”, (2009) 30(7) ECLR 340 at 341-342.
179 See 2011 Consultation document, paras 9–11.
180 Id., paras 12–14.
181 See e.g.Report on theWhite Paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules,Mar.9,2009,
available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A6-2009-
0123&format=XML&language=EN,sect.J5-J6;for commentary,see inter aliaCengiz,Antitrust damages’ ac-
tion: lessons from American indirect purchasers’ litigation, 59 ICLQ 39, 55–56 (2010); also Marcos and
Sanchez—Graells, “Toward a European tort law? Damages action for breach of EC antitrust rules:
harmonising tort law through the back door”, available at: http://papers.ssrn. com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=1028963,pp.6–7.
182 See e.g. Impact Assessment Document, accompanying the 2008White Paper, paras 286–288.
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23(b)(3), are truly suitable to being litigated via representation, especially due to
the nature of the class and to the evidence prima facie proffered to prove the
existence of the elements of the alleged infringement.183 In addition, the brief
examination of the legislation in force in a number of Member States, which now
allow for ‘US style’ class actions, provided clear evidence of the acceptance of these
lawsuits as a ‘suitable’ tool for collective redress in several jurisdictions.
Against this background, it is argued that opt-out actions can no longer be
dismissed as incompatible with the accepted patterns of litigation across the Union
or indeed as a source of ‘abuse of process’, as asserted by the Commission. 184 It is
submitted that these actions can contribute to boosting the private enforcement of
the competition rules, the access to justice and the fairness of adjudication of
claims arising from the consequences of widespread, ‘diffuse’ torts, without
endangering the overall fairness of litigation. 185 It is suggested that the Emerald
Supplies litigation has both provided evidence of the flaws of the English system,
which is focused on opt-in and representative actions, and demonstrated the ability
and the willingness of domestic courts to actively scrutinize the suitability of
specific collective claims to being decided by representation. 186
It is submitted that provided that appropriate procedural limits and safeguards
are in place to empower the domestic courts to act as ‘gatekeepers’ to the access to
and as ‘guardians’ of representative litigation, opt-out actions could effectively
complement other ‘preferred’ methods of collective dispute resolution and thereby
help increasing the take up of competition damages’ and other ‘diffuse tort’
actions. It is argued that by allowing for adjudication by representation on behalf
of all those similarly affected by the consequences of the same piece of harmful
behaviour, these lawsuits could overcome the ‘inertia effect’ characterizing low
value claimants, who would not spontaneously seek individual redress of their
injuries, and consequently provide greater access to justice both more cheaply and
more easily.187 In this context, a ‘scrupulous’ certification inquiry focused on the
homogeneity of interests across the class and on the prima facie availability of
‘class-wide proof ’ for the elements of each infringement and an appropriate degree
of oversight of litigation up to the end of the proceedings would contribute to
183 See e.g. In Re: Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litigation, 552 F3d 305; also, mutatis mutandis, Wal-Mart
Stores Inc v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541.
184 See e.g. 2011 Consultation document, paras 9–14.
185 See inter alia Mulheron, Recent milestones in class action reform in England: a critique and a proposal, 127
(Apr) LQR 288 (2011) ; also Marcos and Sanchez-Graells, supra n. 182, p. 7–8.
186 See e.g. Mulheron, Emerald Supplies Ltd v. British Airways: a century later the ghost of Market lives on,
8 Competition L. J. 159 (2009) ; also id.,“A missed gem of an opportunity for the representative rule”,
University of Cambridge Faculty of Law research paper No 18/2011, available at: http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1837479, p. 3; see also pp. 11–12.
187 See, inter alia, Hodges,Collective redress in Europe: the new model, 29 CJQ 370, 375–376 (2010).
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striking a fair balance between fairness and efficiency in the decision of these
disputes.188
It is therefore concluded that the EU Commission, rather than ‘clinging on’ to
long-standing prejudices against class actions, should undertake a far wider-ranging
discussion of the possible options for an effective framework of collective redress in
the EU, not just for competition law but also in the wider context of tort law,
especially to improve the conditions of recourse to the courts for those potential
claimants who lack the financial wherewithal, the necessary knowledge or indeed
the economic incentive to seek relief.While it is clear that the concerns for the
effective and at the same time fair adjudication of ‘diffuse injury’ claims cannot be
downplayed, it is hoped that the Commission will come to regard ‘US style’
opt-out actions no longer as a source of abuse but as an acceptable alternative to
other forms of collective actions that are perhaps less controversial.189
188 See, inter alia, response of the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) to the 2011 Consultation document,
available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2011_collective_redress/office_fair_trading_
en. pdf, pp. 5-6; for commentary, inter alia, Gaudet, supra n. 140, pp. 116–117.
189 See, inter alia, the Response of the Civil Justice Council (CJC) to the 2011 Consultation document,
available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2011_collective_redress/cjc_en. pdf,
para. 36.
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